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SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: PRIVATE
INVESTOR HAS PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER
SECTION 14(a)
Iq the recent case of Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp.,' the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Section 14(a) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934,2 implemented by rule X-I4A-9,3 creates
a substantive federal right in a private investor to enjoin the use of
fraudulently solicited proxies.
Plaintiffs, stockholders in Studebaker-Packard Corporation, brought
suit in their own behalf and in behalf of shareholders similarly situated
against the company and individual directors, alleging defendants had
fraudulently solicited proxies in violation of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,4 and had made an inaccurate count and report of the votes
1 288 F.2d 2o (6th Cir. 1961).
"It shall be unlawful for any person, by use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of any national securities
exchange or otherwise to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy
or consent or authorization in respect of any security . . . registered on any national
securities exchange in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors." 48 Stat. 895 (1934)
, 
15 U.S.C. § 78n (958).
a "No solicitation . . . shall be made by means of any proxy statement, form of
proxy, notice of meeting, or other communication, written or oral, containing any
statement which, at the time and in light of the circumstances under which it is made,
is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any
material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading
or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect to
solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has become false
or misleading." SEC Reg. 14, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (Supp. ig6o).
' Plaintiffs charged that the individual defendant directors fraudulently solicited
Studebaker-Packard stockholders' proxies through the United States mails by means
of false and misleading statements with respect to material facts and by omitting to
state material facts necessary to' make the statements not false and misleading. Brief
for Appellants, pp. 4, 6a-7a.
Defendants' representations allegedly misled shareholders into believing that. a
merger of Curtis-Wright and Studebaker-Packard resources was planned which would
yield additional hundreds of millions of dollars in new government contracts; and
that there would be a preservation of Studebaker-Packard assets coupled with an
opening of greater opportunities in the fields of aerophysics, guided missiles, and
electronics. Studebaker-Packard's cost-plus government contracts were reported to be
unprofitable, and the lack of shareholder information concerning its subsidiary, the
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cast at the stockholders' meeting at which certain management pro-
posals were approved.5 The complaint sought a recount of the votes
cast for the proposals, rescission of resulting consummated transactions,(
and damages for injuries sustained from those transactions.' The dis-
strict court sustained defendants' motion to dismiss in which they con-
tended, inter alia,s that plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.
On appeal, the first question faced by the court was whether the Se-
curities Exchange Act had created a private federal right which plain-
tiffs had standing to assert." The general provisions of the act afford
Aerophysics Corporation, made it impossible to determine whether an adequate price
was to be paid. The plaintiffs further claimed that the material misrepresented that
shareholders would have preemptive rights to new issue shares, and that Studebaker-
Packard's former president had forfeited all his rights to salary and settlement. Brief
for Appellants, pp. 8-is.
'The proposals allegedly sought stockholder endorsement for certain "arrange-
ments" with the Curtis-Wright and Utica-Bend Corporations which included assigning
contracts, selling and leasing property, offering a stock option, and securing manage-
ment assistance. See note 6 infra. Plaintiffs charged that while management's pro-
posals required two-thirds approval of outstanding shares, they received less than fifty
percent of the vote. Passage of the proposals, plaintiffs claimed, was due to indi-
vidual defendants' failure to properly inspect the proxies. Brief for Appellants, pp.
8-9.
dAs a result of the allegedly fraudulent solicitations, plaintiffs claimed defendant
corporation (x) assigned all its government contracts valued at $70,000,000 to Curtis-
Wright; (2) transferred its accumulated assets in the Aerophysics Corporation to
Curtis-Wrightwithout any inventory, appraisal, or adequate consideration; (3) granted
an option to Curtis-Wright to purchase millions of dollars of Studebaker-Packard stock
at $5 per share; and (4) submitted to management by Curtis-Wright under the guise
of an Advisory Management Agreement whereby Studebaker-Packard directors sur-
rendered their right to independent action. Brief for Appellants, pp. 8-9.
"Plaintiffs charged that the agreements did not yield a merger of assets and facili-
ties, did not enable Studebaker-Packard to obtain a large volume of government con-
tracts, and resulted in a sale of the Aerophysics subsidiary to Curtis-Wright at a grossly
inadequate price. Moreover, it was claimed that the stock option granted to Curtis-
Wright overrode the shareholders' right of preemption; and that contrary to the
implication that Studebaker-Packard's former president had forfeited his salary and
settlement benefits, he had, in fact, continued to enjoy both. Brief for Apellants, pp.
5-o.
'Defendants' motion was ". The District Court lacked jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter ...and/or 2. The amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, and/or 3. The amended complaint failed to comply with the
mandatory requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b) ...and/or 4. The plain-
tiffs . . . failed to join indispensible parties. . . ." 288 F.2d at 2o. The district
court gave no indication which of the grounds it relied upon for dismissal. Ibid.
" Only two cases had previously considered the question of an express private right
under the section. Howard v. Furst, 140 F. Supp. 507, 51o, 512 (S.D.N.Y.), 238
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investors in securities protection against market manipulation, while
the specific provisions of section 4(a) control conditions under which
proxies may be solicited.' ° The court found "that the federal 'right'
sought to be protected by this section of the Act is the stockholders' right
to full and fair disclosure in corporate elections by proxy."" At this
F.zd 790, 793 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957) (question of a
private right left open on appeal) ; Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.zd 753, 765 (2d Cir.)
(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883 (x955).
Although no previous case had formally defined the existence of a private right of
action, several cases had implied the existence of some right. The first case to recog-
nize any private right of action was Tate v. Sonotone Corp., 5 SEC Jud. Dec. 31Q
(S.D.N.Y. 1947), where the court without opinion issued a two-week restraining order
upon petition by a shareholder to enjoin the corporation from holding its annual meet-
ing until the management had complied with the proxy rules. In Phillips v. United
Corp., 5 SEC Jud. Dec. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), a qualified private right of action was
recognized when the SEC failed to act after a shareholder's request. There a stock-
holder sought to enjoin a registered holding company from action to effect its trans-
formation into an investment company because the proxies approving the transformation
were allegedly obtained in violation of § 14(a). See cases collected in Loss, The SEC
Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1041, 1046 n.I5 (196o), in 2 Loss,
SECURITIEs REGULATION 933 n.289 (2d ed. 1961).
10 See Stock Exchange Practices, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency on S. Res. 84, 72d Cong., and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97, 7 3 d Cong.,
xst & 2d Sess. (193-34),; H.R. REP. No. 1383, 7 3 d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1934)i
S. REP. No. 792, 7 3 d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1934). The Senate report indicates
Congressional feeling that "the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission
will protect investors from promiscuous solicitation of their proxies, on the one hand
by irresponsible outsiders seeking to wrest control of the corporation away from honest
and conscientious officials;. on the other hand by unscrupulous corporate oicials seeking
to retain control of the management by concealing or distorting facts." S. REP. No.
1455, 2d Sess. 77 (1934). ,Accord, SEC v. May, 229 F.2d 123, 124 (2d Cir. 1956);
SEC v. Transamerica Corp., x63 F.2d 5x,, Sx8 (1947)
, 
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847
(1948) (found intent of Congress was to require fair operation of corporate sufferage).
12 288 F.2d at 208. Neither § 14(a) nor rule X-s4A- 9 provide for a private civil
remedy as do three sections of the act, e.g., § 9 (e) ; § 16(b) ; § 18. It is well settled,
however, that courts will recognize a civil cause of action in tort if the violation of a
criminal statute injures a member of the class whose interests the statute was enacted
to protect. See SEC v. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943) (to effect that
the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is subordinate to the general purpose
of the act); Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.ad 790, 805 & n.12 (3 d Cir.
1949) ; see generally Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a
Close Corporation Under the S.E.C. Statutes, is LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 505, 512(s53).
A "right," therefore, was recognized even as to plaintiffs whose proxies were not
claimed to have been solicited. Contra, Textron, Inc. v. American Woolen Co., 12z
F. Supp. 305 (D. Mass. 1954); Commonwealth ex rel. Laughlin v. Green, 4 SEC
Jud. Dec. x45 (Pa. C.P. 1944), aff'd without mention of proxy rules, 351 Pa. 170,
40 A.2d 492 (945).
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point the court had to reconcile the recent Second Circuit decision in
Howard v. Furst2 that section 14(a) does not create a right of action
in the corporation which the shareholder can assert derivatively under
federal law. The court distinguished Howard by noting that the
question in Dann dealt with invasion of the individual shareholder's
right of franchise rather than damages to the corporation.18  Since the
right of franchise is individual, Howard was held to be inapplicable.
Having found a federal right which plaintiffs had standing to assert,
the court turned to consideration of the remedy available. Here two
conflicting approaches were encountered. One would recognize com-
plete federal jurisdiction to dispose of all issues raised in the plead-
ings; 14 the other would restrict jurisdiction to a determination of
whether a federal right had been violated. 5 To have allowed complete
federal jurisdiction in Dann would necessarily have involved determina-
122 38 F.2d 790 (zd Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.s. 937 (1957), 70 HARV. L.
REV. 1493 (1957), 1o5 U. PA. L. REV. iox6 (1957). A shareholder brought a de-
rivative action against corporate directors to enjoin voting of proxies allegedly obtained
through fraudulent statements. Dismissal of the complaint was upheld on the gruond
that the act did not create substantive rights for the benefit of the corporation. 238
F.zd at 793.
"s One of the main obstacles presented by the Howard case was its holding that
although a shareholder may claim to assert an individual right, in reality, since the
damages he suffers are secondary to him through injury to the corporation, his assertion
is basically on behalf of the corporation. Ibid. The court, in a candid admission,
avoided this pitfall by stating: "Of course, the general rules [concerning whether an
injury is derivative or individual] . . . , in 'the last analysis, are merely legal
formalisms in which the Court elects to clothe its choice of the underlying policy con-
siderations upon which the real basis of decision must rest. In characterizing this
action as 'derivative' or as 'individual,' basically we are faced with the problem of
determining whether to emphasize the right violated, or the damage which resulted.
In this case, we choose to lay emphasis upon the right violated, which is individual
and primary." 288 F.zd at z-.
1" The doctrine that for every federal right there is a federal remedy is generally
attributed to Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1946). Support has been given
to complete federal jurisdiction in cases arising under § i4(a) of the Exchange Act.
See, e.g., Mack v. Mishkin, 172 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. x959)5 Horwitz v. Balaban,
112 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1949)5 cf. Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.zd 238 (zd Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944). This position has long been advocated by Pro-
fessor Loss in his exhaustive works on the subject. See generally Loss, The SEC
Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1041, 1045-58 (196o), in z Loss,
SECurlTIES REGULATION 932-73 (ad. ed. 1961). The Securities Exchange Commis-
sion also favors, complete federal 'jurisdiction. Brief for the SEC on appeal to the
9 th Cir. as Amicus Curiae from the decision in Sawyer v. Pioneer Mill Co., Ltd., 1go
F. Supp. zi (D. Hawaii 196i).
"nHoward v. Furst, 140 F. Supp. 507, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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tion of the parties' rights with respect to the effects of the alleged
invalidity of the proxies. The majority of the court opposed this
because they felt that determination of effects would primarily involve
issues of state law to which the federal claim would be only "col-
lateral"' 0  Restricted jurisdiction, on the other hand, would have
encouraged piecemeal litigation, a result which the court equally
opposed.
In effect the court adopted a combination of the two approaches,
holding that a private investor who has standing to assert a federal
right of action because of violation of section 14(a) may be granted
prospective relief. This holding restricts federal jurisdiction to de-
termination of the validity of proxies solicited and affords injunctive
protection up until the time the proxy is exercised; thereafter relief
is limited to a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the proxies.
The court reasoned that this was "the cleanest joint at which to amputate
the long arm of federal law in this area' 17 and that prevention is the
best cure for "injection of misleading statements into a proxy fight."'
Since the proxies in the instant case had long since been voted, 9 plain-
tiffs were left without effective federal relief. However, plaintiffs had
concurrently initiated a derivative suit in a Michigan state court"
16 288 F.2d at 215. The court could have granted complete relief by assuming
pendent jurisdiction. This was rejected, however, because of failure to meet the test
of Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933), that "substantially identical facts" must
"support both the local and federal theories of recovery." The court said that "more
facts are necessary to support a recission [sic] of the election under state law than
. . . to establish the fact that the proxies . . . were solicited by the use of false and mit-
leading material." z88 F.zd at 25. But see Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 ( 9 th
Cir. 1956). There pendent jurisdiction was granted in an action under § 1o(b) where
both the state and the federal actions were held to have arisen out of the same set of
facts, i.e., fraud. The court said that "the thought of requiring two law suits in the
situation is untenable." Id. at 454-
The concurring opinion in Dam endorsed the complete jurisdiction approach, but
joined the majority on the ground that rescission was correctly denied below on the
merits either because the statute did not include retrospective relief, or in the alternative,
because of the equities of the case. 288 F.2d at 2t8.
17 288 F.2d at 214.
a"z83 F.2d at as,. Query whether this truism is as valid as the court would
assert. Certainly the threat of civil liability after the election would serve to put
teeth into the prohibitory sanctions of the statute. See, e.g., Mosser v. Darrow, 341
U.S. 267, 274 (s95i), where the Court said that "the most effective sanction for good
administration is personal liability for the consequences of the forbidden acts. .... 
"The proxies were voted at the shareholders' meeting held on October 3 , 1956.
z88 F.2d at 205.
O Fong v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., #17821.
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which sought relief "predicated upon the vote.., and... representa-
tions in the proxy material."12 1 If the state court viewed the two actions
as the same, the concurrent state suit would toll the Michigan statute
of limitations.2 Thus an affirmative federal decree might be the basis
for restrospective relief in the state court.
In the past, the usual remedy for violation of section 14(a) has
been petition by the Securities Exchange Commission to the federal
courts for injunction, 3 although in some instances criminal prosecution
has been instituted against willful violators." Petitions for injunction
have normally been filed by the Commission on its own initiative and,
occasionally, in response to a shareholder's request. Since the SEC is
not bound to act upon the individual shareholder's request,2' and since
until Dann no private federal right under section 14(a) had been ex-
pressly recognized, °2 an aggrieved shareholder has been without reliable
individual remedy for an alleged violation of the federal proxy rules.
-Neither has the private investor had the right to institute a derivative
proceeding in a federal court on behalf of the corporation.27  Further-
more,* state -courts -have unanimously refused to take jurisdiction-in
any suit based upon violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
'because of its exclusive federal jurisdiction provision .2  The private
'"-Reply Brief for Appellants, p. 26.
2The Michigan statute of limitations for action against directors for breach of
duties is either six years from the date of the delinquency, or two years from the time
the complainant discovered the delinquency, whichever is the sooner. MICH. CoTM1P.
LAWS- § 450.47 (1948). See generally 54 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions § z6x (x948,
Supp. 1961), to the effect that commencement of an action will suspend the running of
the statute .as to that specific claim -asserted in the action.
'"Securities Exchange Act of 1934- § 21(e), 48 Stat. 899 (1934), as amended, i5
U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1958). In most instances an affirmative or negative injunction has
served as sufcient means by which to control proxy solicitation. See Loss, The SEC
Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1041, io68-83 (196o), in z Loss,
SEcuRITIEs REGULATION 956-7, (2d ed. 1961).
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32, 48 Stat. 904 (1934), as amended, x5
U.S.C. § 7 8ff (1958). Very few criminal prosecutions have been instituted for viola-
tion of the proxy rules; in fact, there are none on record prior to x96o. See 3 Loss,
SEcURITIEs REGULATION 1984-2004 & n.59 (2d ed. 596!).
"See, e.g., Phillips v. United Corp., 5 SEC Jud. Dec. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), where
the SEC refrained from acting after a shareholder had submitted his grievance.
6 See note 9 supra.
"'Howard v. Furst, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956). See S. REP. No. 792, 7 3 d
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1934); 78 CONG. REC. 8099 (934).
" Section 27 of the act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts of any
"violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter
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investor, therefore, has been left without a remedy, save petition to the
SEC requesting action, for violation of a federal statute admittedly en-
acted for his protection. In essence, the holding in Dann endows the
private investor with the same power of injunction which has been
effectively employed by the SEC.
In some respects Dann may be viewed as an important breakthrough
in the direction of granting a complete federal remedy for violations
of the proxy rules of the Exchange Act. Although several federal
courts have endorsed by dictum an extension of federal relief available
under section 14(a) to include retrospective remedies, no case has yet
combined recognition of a private right with an award of retrospective
relief."  The act itself does not declare that action taken at a meeting
pursuant to proxies obtained in violation of section 14(a) will be
invalid." Nevertheless, proponents of such relief would infer such a
provision by implication.31 Support for this position might be found
or the rules-and regulations thereunder." 48 Stat. 9o2 (934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1958). Accord, In re R. Hoe & Co., 137 N.Y.S.zd 14z (Sup. Ct. 1954),
aff'd,-z85 App. Div. 927, 139 N.Y.S.zd 883, aff'd 309 N.Y. 719, xz8 N.E.2d 420
.(1955); Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co. i z3 N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.zd 862 (Ch. 1952),
aff'd, iz N.J. 467, 97 A.zd 437 (1953) 5 Investment Associates, Inc. v. Standard Power
& Light Corp., 29 Del. Ch. Z25, 48 A.2d 5ox (Ch. 1946), aff'd, 29 Del. Ch. 593,
51 A.zd 572 (Sup. Ct. 1947)i American Distilling Co. v. Brown, 295 N.Y. 36, 64
N.E.zd 347 (1945)i but cf. Wyatt v. Armstrong, 186 Misc. 216, 59 N.Y.S.zd 5oz
(Sup.. Ct. 1945); Levy v. Feinberg, 29 N.Y.S.zd 550 (Sup. Ct. 1941), rev'd on other
grounds, 265 App. Div. zo8, 38 N.Y.S.2d 5 1 7 (1942). See generally Loss, The SEC
Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1249 (196o), in 2 Loss, SECURITIEs
REGULATION 973-1019 (2d ed. 1961).
2 In Horwitz v. Balaban, 112 F. Supp. 99, 103 (S.D.N.Y. '949), the court said
that failure to comply with § 14(a) would render a contract for a stock conversion
option void. Accord, Mack v. Mishkin, 172 F. Supp. 885, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Textron, Inc. v. American Woolen Co., 122 F. Supp. 305, 308 (D. Mass. 1954); cf.
Weeks v. Alpert, 131 F. Supp. 6o8 (D. Mass. 1954) 5 Curtin v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 124 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) i Dunn v. Decca Records, Inc., 120 F. Supp.
i (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Doyle v. Milton, 73 F. Supp. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). See gen-
erally Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1o4x, io68-85
(596o), in 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION-956- 7 3 (zd ed. 196i).
"o The Commission does not favor an ipso facto doctrine of proxy invalidity for any
violation; rather, it is felt, the legal effect of non-compliance with the proxy rules is
for court determination. Accord, Textron, Inc. v. American Woolen Co., supra note
29. For background see Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1041Y 1072-85 & n.127 (196o), in 2 Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 960-73 & n.407
(2d ed. 1961).
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29, 48 Stat. 903 (1934)y as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 78cc (1958), provides that "(b) Every contract made in violation of any
provision . . . shall be void .... " Thus it is argued that since violation of § 14(a)
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in cases arising under similar sections of the Exchange Act which are
also solely prohibitory on their face, but from which courts have in-
ferred authority to grant civil relief, including rescission of completed
transactions.32
There are some important procedural advantages to the share-
holder-claimant implicit in complete federal jurisdiction. Primarily
they are elimination of piecemeal litigation; expeditious disposition of
claims; and availability of broad venue, 3 nation-wide service of process, 4
liberal pleading requirements, 5 and lenient amendment policies30  On
the other hand, certain policy considerations militate against complete
federal jurisdiction. The primary role of the federal judiciary would
change from assisting the SEC in controlling proxy solicitation by
issuance of injunctions, to being an active participant serving as a
voids the proxy contract, the vote of the void proxy is nugatory. See, e.g., Goldstein
v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d -Cir. 1944); Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F.
Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 194i).
"2See Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d x95 (sth Cir. 596o)
(§ to(b)); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.zd 447 (9th Cir. 1956) (§ 1o(b)); Baird v.
Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) (§ 6(b));
Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (§ is(c)(s)); Hawkins v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949)
(§§ zx(d)(2) and 17(a)); Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp., 81 F. Supp. o14
(D. Mass. 1949) (§ 7 (a)-(d)); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798
(ED. Pa. 1947) (§ xo(b)). Section io(b), it should be noted, is distinguishable
from § 14(a) in that it prohibits the use of fraudulent devices to effect the sale or
purchase of securities. Civil damages naturally follow when the prohibited event
occurs. Section 24(a), however, prohibits fraudulent solicitation of the proxy and
not its use.
" Action may be brought in the district court where the defendant "is found or
is an inhabitant or transacts business... ." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 48
Stat. 903 (x934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1958). See United States v. Olen,
183 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1g6o) (action brought in the district where corporate
books were kept)$ Greenwich Say. Bank v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) (venue proper where misrepresentation made).
, ""[P]rocess . . . may be served in any . . . district of which the defendant is
an inhabitat or wherever the defendant may be found." Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 27, supra note 33. See Thiele v. Shields, 13% F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
(defendants served with process in Nebraska for action in New York).
"'See generally Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456 (1943); 2 MOOR,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.z4 (2d ed. 1953, Supp. 196o ) ; but see Buery v. Buery, 127
F. Supp. 786 (S.M.W. Va. x954), where an allegation of fraud on the part of a
corporation president in manipulating stock transactions to his own benefit was held
insufficient to state a cause of action.
" See Fa. R. Civ. P. 1s(a); iA BARRON & HoxTzopi, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 441-45 (596o, Supp. 196o); Clark, The Bar and The Recent Reform
of Procedure, 25 A.B.A.J. 22 (1939).
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forum for any shareholder's petition for restrospective civil relief based
upon an alleged violation of the proxy rules. This would make of the
federal courts easily accessible forums for individual harassment or
nuisance suits against the corporation and its directors, without effective
means of protecting the defendants from mala fide claims.37 Also,
federal courts would have either to determine what effect state law
would give to proxies declared invalid under section 14(a) or formulate
federal law in this area.
The court, therefore, achieved a fairly successful compromise of
conflicting policy considerations by rejecting pendent jurisdiction38 and
restricting the scope of the newly recognized private federal "right" to
prospective relief. In effect, the court accomplished a dual result. It
combined formal recognition of a private right under the act with an
effective instrument of prevention, while at the same time it forestalled
the prospect of harassment and nuisance suits. Secondly, while adju-
dication of a claimant's federal right was granted, an extension of federal
jurisdiction into matters of state corporation law was ostensibly avoided
by leaving determination of the effect of proxy invalidity to the state
courts.
The rule in Dann provides the aggrieved private investor two
channels for relief. Prior to the proxy election, it is dear that federal
courts may grant injunctive relief for a violation of section 14(a). It
would seem that a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the proxies
under federal law would also be proper at this time. Before the elec;
"It is generally the rule that a suit brought by a shareholder against directors or
officers who have defrauded or mismanaged a corporation, thus affecting share values,
is derivative in nature, and the shareholder is considered to have no direct individual
right of action. Smith v. Bramwell, 146 Ore. 61x, 31 P.zd 647 (1934); BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS 333 (rev. ed. 1946). In such derivative actions.Fed. R. Civ. P. z 3 (b)
requires that "the complaint shall be verified by oath and shall aver . . . (2) that the
action is not a collusive one to confer on the court of the United States jurisdiction of
any action of which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction. The complaint shall also
set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure from the managing
directots or trustees and, if necessary, from the shareholders such action as he desires,
and the reasons for his failure to obtain such action or the reasons for not making such
effort."
In an individual action such limitations and restrictions are not required. Of course,
FED. R. Civ. P. i i provides that claimant's attorney must certify "that to the best of
his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support [the claim] .... " .
However, any technical breach of the Exchange Act could serve as "good ground" to
support a mala fide harassment action. See also United States v. Long, io F.R.D.
443 (D. Neb. 1950), where a certification was honored with misgivings.
" See note 13 supra.
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tion, therefore, both injunctive relief and the means to apply con-
currently for state remedial relief may be obtained in the federal courts.
After the proxies have been voted, however, only a declaratory judg-
ment as to the validity of the proxies under federal law may be
granted. Any affirmative relief after the election must come from the
state courts.
The effect which state courts will give a federal decree of proxy
invalidity is uncertain. They could accept the decree as res judicatai
concerning the invalidity of the proxies under state law and turn their
attention to determination of the effects of void votes on previous
.corporate elections and resulting transactions." The net effect of this
reception would be for federal courts to determine the abstract legal
-question of violation of the proxy fraud rules without regard to the
ultimate effect of its decision; while the state courts would face the
complex tftsk of determining the effects of the abstract decree. How-
.ever, It could be argued that res judicata is applicable only to the extent
'that it ifivalidates the -proxies under federal law. The prohibitions of
section 14(a) are directed toward proxy solicitation material, 'and there-
fore section 2941 of the act can operate only to .invalidate the resulting
proxy contract.. Res judicata, by this reasoning, would apply only to
establish the fact of federal proxy invalidity, while the deductive process
of determining the effect of the judgment would be quite distinct41
Comparq Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., zz. F.2d 184, 188-89 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 3 50 U.S. 825 (1955) (a state court's adjudication that there had
been no violation of the federal anti-trust laws was not regarded as res judicata in an
action for an accounting on an agency contract), and RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 71,
comment c (1942) (federal court not bound by incidental determination of a matter
by a state ourt which the federal courts alone have jurisdiction to determine directly)
'wdth Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 154 F. Supp. 64 (D. Del. 1954)
, 
where plaintiff was
denied an injunction for an alleged violation of the federal proxy fraud rules on the
basis of a previous state court adjudication of the fraud issue. The federal court held
that the issue of fraud was the same, whether federal or state, and it had been con-
clusively determined against the plaintiff in the state proceedings. See also Sutton v.
Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (195z), where the Court held that Illinois must accord full faith
and credit to a New York annulment of a Nevada marriage, but left the state court
free to determine the effect of such annulment under Illinois law. For the effect of
laches, see Hombert v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
oSee note 31 supra.
41 "[W]e do not hesitate to hold that . . . no fact *decided in the first [suit] whether
(ultimate' or a 'mediate -datum,' conclusively establishes any 'mediate datum' in the
second, or anyihing except a fact 'ultimate' in that 'uit." The Evergreens v. Numan,
141 F.2d 927, 930-31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1940) i RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS § 68, comment p (1942, Supp. 1948).
[Vol. 1962: 151
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A state court could possibly hold that res judicata would not be
applicable in a subsequent petition for restrospective relief. The court
in Dann held that it was "without jurisdiction... to rescind corporate
transactions already consummated because of allegedly improperly
solicited proxies.""2 It could be contended that since res judicata applies
only to those issues over which the previous court had jurisdiction,"
a federal decree of proxy invalidity would be res judicata only as to
prospective relief and would not be binding in a petition for retro-
spective relief.
Thus, there is a likelihood of inconsistent state court application of
federal decrees concerning proxy invalidity. To avoid this result, the
court could have remanded the case for declaratory judgment only
as to violation of the proxy rules and the severity of such violation,
thereby allowing the state courts latitude to determine both the in-
validity and the subsequent effects. It seems inconsistent that the court
should assume jurisdiction to determine the ultimate ground upon which
rescission could be granted, e.g., proxy invalidity, while it denies, at
the same time, its own jurisdiction to effect such a result.4
It is doubtful that the rule in Dann giving the traditional "ag-
grieved shareholder" a "right" to demand corporate compliance with
the statutory sanctions of section 14(a) by invocation of pre-election
injunction will significantly reduce the injection of misleading informa-
tion into proxy solicitation material. The average investor is poorly
equipped to recognize misleading information in solicitation statements;
whereas the SEC, with its facilities and staff of trained personnel,.
routinely examines the material with professional criticism and expert
knowledge of the proxy rules. 45 However, the new threat of a post-
:2 288 F.2d at 214.
a RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 7, 1o, 71. It could also be argued that § 27 of'
the act, by reserving exclusive federal jurisdiction in "actions brought to enforce any
liability or duty created . . .Y precludes state courts from assuming jurisdiction to
"enforce" the federal decree. See In re R. Hoe & Co., 137 N.Y.S.2d 142, 149 (Sup.
Ct. 1954), where the court said that "exclusive jurisdiction to grant a remedy for
violation . . . is in the Federal courts."
"'Perhaps the court was concerned with the fact that a determination of a violation
of the federal proxy fraud rules might fail to support violation of the "hornbook"
deceit laws of some states. Cf. Investment Associates, Inc. v. Standard Power & Light
Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 225, 48 A.2d 5oi (Ch. 1946) (rule X-14 A-i could have been
violated, but still not be grounds for relief under Delaware law). See generally 3
Loss, ISECURITIES REGULATION 1430-44 (2d ed. 196i).
"Proxy solicitation material must be submitted to the SEC ten days prior to the-
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election civil suit may have a significant prohibitive impact on would-be
violators. The magnitude of the threat, of course, depends upon
the effect which state courts afford the federal decree of proxy in-
validity.
date when copies are to be sent to the shareholders. SEC Reg. 14, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-6 (Supp. 196o).
